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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

GRENADA, CASE STUDY IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

BY

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ABSTRACT

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Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada during the Fall of 1983 presents a valuable case study by which to evaluate the accuracy and relevance of the current Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. This study examines operations in Grenada in terms of types of operations and the doctrinal principles of MOOTW. The study begins with a general review of the operation and current MOOTW doctrine; an analysis of how the operation fits into the doctrine follows. Sources are listed in the bibliography, but also include personal observations by the author who participated in the operation.

INTRODUCTION

Operation Urgent Fury and subsequent operations designed to stabilize the island of Grenada economically and politically, offer a valuable example for examining the current doctrine on military operations other than war found in <u>Joint Publication 3-07</u>. As this study will show, the United States intervention on the island of Grenada was characteristically a military operation other than war. The current doctrine found in <u>Joint Pub 3-07</u> provides the tools for a thorough analysis and evaluation of such operations. This evaluation will prove that the Grenada operations were flawed in many ways. This, however, is understandable considering that a doctrinal base for the conduct of MOOTW was not then available.

The complexity of what initially appears to be a straightforward and simple type of mission is evident as one delves into the doctrine. Grenada makes this complexity very obvious. Today, more than twelve years after Urgent Fury, controversy surrounding that operation continues. Analyzing it by using Joint Pub 3-07 does not resolve all the questions, but it definitely makes Urgent Fury and related operations much easier to understand. This understanding is not only important in a historical sense, but also provides a framework for planning and executing future operations. Even though not all operations have been or will ever be identical, such an analysis provides enough parallels to keep us from treading onto new ground with every new mission. Adherence to the principles and understanding of the wide range of operations possible in MOOTW will prevent the confusion and, in some cases, the disasters that have tainted some of our recent missions. If nothing else, this will result in a more cautious and less simplistic approach to future operations. This is because from the beginning we will understand them as

very complex and very potentially volatile situations that will challenge the ultimate skills of strategic thinking and diplomacy.

This paper does not try to solve the many controversies surrounding Urgent Fury. It simply looks at the operation through the most recent doctrine and dissects it according to that doctrine. The value of this is that it provides for a reference point by which to gauge future operations. The first step is to recognize the many types of operations possible in MOOTW; the second is to apply the principles found in <u>Joint Pub 3-07</u>.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF OPERATION URGENT FURY

Operation Urgent Fury took place on the island of Grenada on 25 October 1983. Besides attempting to stabilize a political situation made worse by the assassination of Prime Minister Bishop, the operation also sought to protect the American medical students on the island and to end the Cuban and Soviet influence that had been steadily increasing over the past two years. The offensive phase of the operation lasted less than a week and employed approximately 1,900 U.S. Army troops and Marines. Additionally, Caribbean nations provided military forces to the operation. United States involvement did not end with the defeat of the Cuban and Grenadian forces. It continued with Operation Island Breeze, a peacekeeping effort that "concluded in mid-December". Civil Affairs units conducted operations on the island until August 1985. These operations involved everything from establishment of democratic institutions to the reestablishment of the economy. A requirement to provide a "tourism specialist to restore Grenada's tourism industry" illustrates the depth to which the military had to perform non-warfighting duties. The Army found one such person in the reserves. This turned out to be a

reserve major who was the deputy director of tourism for Philadelphia and who readily volunteered.

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

GENERAL

With the rise in instability and conflict after the fall of the Soviet Union, the methodology with which the United States deals with military situations that do not approximate the full intensity of war has become increasingly important. It is incorrect to say that this is new; it is not. Army doctrine and practice have often had to deal with the challenges of operations that do not necessarily include large sacle use of offensive military force. Past examples of these types of operations include U.S. Army operations in the Western United States during the last century and the occupations of Japan and Germany after World War II. More recent examples are the Hurricane Andrew, Somalia, and Haiti operations. The terminology has changed through the years. We have used names like *Stability Operations* and *Low Intensity Conflict* to describe just some of the many possibilities. The value of the current doctrine is that it covers the full range of possible missions and helps prevent omission. This methodology is sorely needed because the rate at which these missions are becoming necessary is definitely increasing.

Joint Pub 3-07 states that:

Military operations other than war (MOOTW) can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power. To understand MOOTW, it is useful to understand how they differ from operations in war. Although MOOTW and war may often seem similar in action, MOOTW focus on deterring war and promoting peace while war encompasses large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or protect national interests. MOOTW are more sensitive to political considerations and often the military may not be the primary player.³

This definition clearly points to the fact that there is no exact blueprint for the conduct of MOOTW. Each operation must be individually assessed, planned, and executed. Accordingly,

there is no standard progression of events or types of events within a given operation. Grenada began with a military action that has been likened to an invasion. Somalia, on the other hand, began as a humanitarian mission that later took a decidedly combat-like appearance. Disaster relief may have no appearance of, or potential for combat, while peace operations often straddle the line between aggressive military action and peaceful activity. A review of the types of operations that represent MOOTW and the ones that apply to Grenada will provide a better understanding of the intricacies and difficulties involved.

GRENADA and TYPES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

There are sixteen types of operations listed as MOOTW in <u>Joint Pub 3-07</u>. They include: arms control; combating terrorism; Department of Defense support to counterdrug operations; enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept operations; enforcing exclusion zones; ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight; humanitarian assistance; military support to civil authorities; nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency; noncombatant evacuation operations; peace operations; protection of shipping; recovery operations; show of force operations; strikes and raids; and support to insurgency⁴.

Joint Pub 3-07 lists Grenada under the heading *strikes and raids*. It states, "an example of a strike is Operation Urgent Fury, conducted on the island of Grenada in 1983". Incidentally, Army Field Manuals <u>FM 100-5</u> and <u>FM 100-7</u> use the word "attack" instead of *strike* to describe the same type of operation. It is surprising to find that Urgent Fury is listed only under strikes and raids. This is an oversimplification that does not do justice to what the Grenada operation was because a brief examination will show it to be, or to at least have components of, eleven of the sixteen types of operations mentioned above. The fact that some of the types of operations inherent in the Grenada operations became evident after the fact is irrelevant. Some of these became valid missions later in the conduct of the operation or were inadvertently accomplished in pursuing other missions. If anything, this points to the need for a methodology that helps to

anticipate requirements and provides for a clear declaration of national intent instead of the lack of decisive statement of intent that haunts this operation even to this day. These types of operations and a brief discussion follow.

ARMS CONTROL

Arms control conjures up visions of weapons of mass destruction at a global level. Arms control, however, can be just as crucial a concept when dealing with aggressive, underdeveloped nations that achieve a potential superiority over their neighbors. This superiority may involve only small arms and ammunition. Grenada was potentially such a nation. Located just under 100 miles from the South American mainland and in the midst of numerous peaceful and weak island neighbors, Grenada, with Cuban and Soviet assistance, possessed the means to export Marxist revolution and instability to much of the region. An October 23, 1983 letter from the Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States to the United States requesting military intervention in Grenada stated that:

the capability of the Grenada armed forces is already at a level of sophistication and size far beyond the internal needs of that country. Furthermore the member states of the O.E.C.S. have no means of defense against such forces⁷.

Thus, it was no surprise when U.S. troops found the extensive arsenals of small arms, artillery, and anti-aircraft weapons in warehouses near Point Salines airport.

COMBATTING TERRORISM

It is obvious from the text of the O.E.C.S. letter previously quoted that these nations were very much concerned, as was the United States, that Grenada could serve as a base of operations for Marxist inspired support to insurgencies around the region. Terrorism was definitely a possibility as a course of action by Grenada, especially if encouraged by Cuba. U.S. forces normally charged with the combatting terrorism mission led the operation and conducted

rescue and other operations normally associated with this type of mission. Most important was the immediate preventive effect this operation had on Grenadian potential for terrorism. We can only speculate about the deterrent effect it had on its pursuit by the Cubans and Soviets.

ENSURING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT

Grenada is located in a strategic location at the confluence of the Southern Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. With its proximity to the continental mass to the south and the easy accessibility to numerous air and sea lanes, a Cuban or Soviet dominated government on the island could easily threaten freedom of navigation. The model for this is Cuba and its stranglehold on the Central Caribbean. It is logical to assume that such a situation in Grenada would have created another exclusion area in the region; one that would, under best circumstances, impact on the free movement of ships and airplanes around the island. The unusually long runway that the Grenadian government was building on the southern tip of the island helped to support these fears because this airfield could provide a base of operations for Soviet or Cuban maritime reconnaissance and other combat aircraft. In an affront to the U.S. position, a writer in the Asian Defense Journal states that "in no way can Grenada be seriously regarded as strategically important for USA and its loss could not jeopardize the American security plans⁸. This position ignores that United States interests do not necessarily involve direct threats; these interests include threats to regions and allies that affect political or economic stability and could indirectly affect United States interests. This was the case in Grenada.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

To create an atmosphere of social stability that would result in the resurgence of democratic institutions in Grenada, it was clear from the beginning that the United States would

have to invest heavily in humanitarian assistance. This began almost immediately following the arrival of troops on the island. Much of it began with a typical American soldier charitable approach to helping the local populace. This escalated to a deliberate national effort to help return Grenadian life to normal and then improve on that. U.S. Civil Affairs teams entered the island at D+3° and conducted the following missions: "requisition of local vehicles and accountability, property control, dislocated civilians, critical labor force requirements, food distribution, NEO*10. These teams even provided help to the Soviet embassy*11. Civil Affairs teams continued operations well into December of 1983. United States assistance with some military involvement continued well beyond.

MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES

Much of what the Civil Affairs Teams did directly contributed to the overall effort that quickly restored the democratic institutions that replaced the deposed totalitarian regime. A major form of support was that given to the internal security of the island. The U.S. contingent remaining on the island after the combat forces departed included military policemen with jeep mounted machine guns. Additionally, six U.S. helicopters remained behind to provide easy access to all parts of the island. This contingent also provided support and leadership to "the 450 policemen and soldiers from the seven Caribbean nations that joined the invasion" 12.

NATION ASSISTANCE/SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

This is very closely related to humanitarian assistance and military support to civil authorities. U.S. forces in Grenada assisted in training Grenadian police and the military in counterinsurgency operations. This was a very critical task in the early days after the cessation of hostilities because there were fears that many Cubans and their Grenadian supporters had hidden

in the interior of the island. In December 1983, United States Ambassador Charles A. Gillespie said in an interview that:

we have reports that are sporadic, but not infrequent - one or two times a week - that there is somebody out there in the bamboo that cannot speak English and looks very haggard and wants food and has a pistol in his belt¹³.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION

Perhaps the most widely used and accepted reason for Operation Urgent Fury was the rescue and evacuation of the approximately 1000 U.S. citizens on the island. Although reasons for the operation varied throughout the initial stages of the action, the safety of the American students was always a prime concern. Key tasks of the operation included the securing of all U.S. citizens and their swift evacuation. This did not prove to be an easy task and caused concerns when rescue forces discovered that not all the students were at the expected location. This puzzle was solved and all students were safely evacuated. In all the sources I examined for this study NEO was the most commonly stated reason for Urgent Fury.

PEACE OPERATIONS

Urgent Fury and subsequent operations were not *peace operations* in the realm of a Bosnia or even Haiti mission. They, however, are consistent, at least in spirit, with what we today more comfortably refer to as *peace operations*. The United States forces conducted an operation in Grenada to forcibly evict an undesirable and dangerous government and to foster the atmosphere that would quickly produce a stable and responsible one. The forces left behind were called peacekeeping forces and even though we may not have had the current doctrine and its associated vocabulary, the results were the same, albeit, lacking in the sophistication with which we plan and execute today.

SHOW OF FORCE OPERATIONS

The military operation in Grenada was not planned as a show of force. In retrospect though, we have to agree that it definitely had an effect on the stability of the entire Caribbean basin and Central America. This made it a defacto show of force. Nicaragua and Cuba were both affected by what they saw as an unprecedented United States show of force that effectively caused them both to curb their activities in the region. The Nicaraguan government was convinced that Urgent Fury was a rehearsal for the U.S. invasion of Nicaragua. There is ample evidence to also indicate that rebels in El Salvador took heed of the action in Grenada and reduced their activities against the United States backed government there. Likewise, Surinam, a potential adversary in the region, expelled its Cuban ambassador as a result of Urgent Fury. On the positive side, our friends in the region saw that the United States was willing to back its commitments unlike Cuba and the Soviet Union, both of which had retreated behind a wall of rhetoric. I firmly believe that the eventual demise of the Nicaraguan communists and the reduction in the export of revolutionary activity by Cuba are linked to the close call they both believed they experienced with Urgent Fury.

STRIKES AND RAIDS

As previously mentioned *strikes and raids* is the one category of types of MOOTW where <u>Joint Pub 3-07</u> mentions Grenada and classifies the operation as a strike. The definition of a strike in <u>Joint Pub 1-02</u> is "an attack which is intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective"¹⁴. This definition is too ambiguous, but it seems to assume short duration and limited objectives. Although we can force ourselves to apply this description to Urgent Fury, the definition does not support the reality of what our forces accomplished. This was the occupation

of a country to not only rescue our citizens, but also to decapitate the government, neutralize the armed forces and police, and establish a new political order. This required U.S troops to remain on the island for close to two years. Somehow this just doesn't fit in what I believe to be the intent of the above definition. Maybe Urgent Fury became a military operation other than war after the initial military objectives were achieved, but the plan and the execution definitely resembled an invasion.

The point here is that most of these concepts are so interrelated that at times it is difficult to see where one begins and the other ends. Adding to the confusion is the Administration's vacillation with the objectives and with the name or description for what the United States was doing. In his book <u>Urgent Fury</u>, <u>The Battle for Grenada</u>, British Major Mark Adkin states: Invasion, forceful extraction, pre-dawn vertical insertion, non-permissive evacuation, intervention, and rescue are all words that have been used to describe Urgent Fury; all in their way are correct depending on the viewpoint of the user¹⁵.

PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR in URGENT FURY

Principles provide the means by which to approach just about any subject. This is true of military operations other than war. <u>Joint Pub 3-07</u> lists six principles that apply to MOOTW. These are: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. "While the first three of these principles are derived from the principles of war, the remaining three are MOOTW-specific" 16. It is clear in our examination of what transpired on Grenada in October of 1983 that the United States was sorely lacking in its adherence to these principles. Even though this is recent doctrine not available in 1983, it is interesting to note that we violated those principles that were closely tied to the principles of war. These are the same principles of war that have been unchanged for decades. My analysis of how all of these principles were either

used or ignored during Urgent Fury and subsequent operations on the island of Grenada is not designed to be critical of the actors, but to provide a framework for analysis of past or future operations. The result should be to promote improved performance in the future. As with the previous section on types of MOOTW operations, I will discuss each principle and its application to the Grenada operations.

OBJECTIVE

Simply defined as "direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective" the objective is that around which the entire operation revolves. It focuses the effort of the unit or nation towards a clear goal. Without it we can expect ambiguity, confusion, and, ultimately, chaos.

As I indicated in the previous section on types of operations, in Grenada we did not recognize that we would have to conduct several of the types of operations that we eventually conducted. In fact we accomplished some of these as a by-product of the larger operation. The same is evident with the principles of MOOTW and war. Here we also failed to properly analyze the situation to determine and to clearly define objectives.

The Administration stated that its objectives were to:

"...secure the safety of American citizens and, for that matter, the citizens of other countries, and to assure that any who wish to leave may do so. And second, to help the O.E.C.S. states establish law and order in the country and establish again governmental institutions responsive to the will of the people of Grenada"¹⁷.

To the military these translate into: conduct noncombatant evacuation operation, conduct a rescue if necessary, secure key locations, neutralize or destroy Grenadian and Cuban forces, and help Grenada transition to democratic forms of government. Although it is fairly easy now to list these, it wasn't so easy during the operation. Without a clear declaration of objectives, the *fog of*

war definitely moved in and caused confusion, waste of effort, and casualties. Instructions to units changed often, not in response to changing conditions, but due to lack of clear objectives or sequence of objectives. For lack of a better term, it was the search for the better idea. At one point during the second week of the operation, the 82d Airborne Division seriously pursued deploying additional troops to the island to take advantage of the *great* training opportunities available there. This is not only indicative of how far units deviated from the national objectives, but clearly demonstrated a totally unsophisticated grasp on the political realities of the situation, one, which at the time, called for the immediate redeployment of troops to prevent accusations of American occupation. The result was that there were several *party lines*, all of which the media, Congress, and anyone with any intelligence could interpret to mean that there was confusion and lack of direction. I contend that it was not any particular flaw or collection of flaws in our execution that caused all the criticism, but rather our inability to simply and clearly state our objectives for being on the island.

In defense of the Administration and our senior military leaders, we must consider the realities at the time. This was the first offensive use of sizable ground forces since Vietnam. Without the experience and doctrine we now possess, it was difficult to imagine the operation in terms other than invasion-like. We tried to subconsciously invent a MOOTW methodology and its pertinent vocabulary as the operation progressed, but we never convinced anyone that Operation Urgent Fury was anything more than an invasion. In the hands of critics this fueled the fire of controversy that burns to this day.

UNITY OF EFFORT

Its maxim is simply to "seek unity of effort in every operation" 17. Simply stated, this means to maintain a clear chain of command and to ensure that "all means are directed to a common purpose"18. This was one of Urgent Fury's most evident and potentially dangerous flaws. Although the Atlantic Command formed a joint task force under the command of Admiral Metcalfe, the operation was disjointed from the beginning. LANTCOM, with a staunchly parochial naval orientation, failed, in the early stages of planning, to identify all the units that could best accomplish specific missions. Initially the focus was on Marine forces. As requirements increased and the leadership in Norfolk was gradually educated, the range of units expanded to include the right units for the right jobs, but due to its evolutionary nature, the time for coordination in what was a crisis action planning effort rapidly passed. The result was that forces participating in the operation had very little knowledge of each other's missions, capabilities, and, in some cases, location. The focal point, the task force headquarters aboard ship, was a haphazardly organized group that could do little to influence the situation. Add to this a joint special operations task force that was trying to work for Metcalfe and the National Command Authority at the same time and the picture of confusion further develops. At the end of two weeks into the operation, there was a JTF afloat, the XVIII Airborne Corps HO (FWD). the 82d Airborne Division, the coalition partners, and the Air Force detachment running Point Salines airfield. All had their own ideas on what to do and how to do it and to the casual observer there was no unified direction. Recent operations and specifically MOOTW type operations seem to have profited from this. Bosnia and Haiti are good examples of how we can effectively

organize ourselves and our coalition partners to ensure that the confusion and fog of Grenada do not again become the norm .

SECURITY

"Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage" ¹⁹. This is a key principle of any operation. It emphasizes security at all levels from the strategic down to the individual. At the operational and tactical level this was not a problem in Grenada. With the explosion at the Marine barracks in Beirut a few days before, force protection was a key element of everything that U.S. forces did on the island. All Services provided adequate protection and all of them continued to reinforce it throughout the operation.

It is at the strategic level that the biggest flaws and the worst violations of this principle appear. Security demands knowledge of the enemy and the environment. This is the role of intelligence. A shortage of all types of intelligence characterizes the Grenada operation. The many stories of troops using tourist maps are true. Aviation units drew grids on these maps to develop a makeshift coordinate system that could be used with the Doppler navigation systems on helicopters. There were few aerial photographs and those that were available lacked expert analysis. This caused a Blackhawk helicopter flight to land short of its objective to avoid a building in a hot landing zone. The building shown on the available photo turned out to be a perfectly flat concrete slab on which one or two helicopters could have landed. The result was a landing on an irregular surface that contributed to a collision between two aircraft. This also increased the distance the troops had to maneuver to conduct the assault. The cost was four soldiers killed and two helicopters severely damaged. Although an example at the tactical level, this is a product of the failure of strategic and operational intelligence.

Strategic security was lost before the operation began. Problems associated with unity of effort and command caused the postponement of the initial operation until daylight. Although most of the forces were prepared for a night assault, some were not. This had not been resolved during the planning phase and, as a result, the forces staging from Barbados lingered at the international airport in full view of anyone wishing to look - - Grenada was over an hour's flight away by helicopter so there was ample time for warnings to get to enemy forces on Grenada. At H-Hour it was obvious that the Cubans and Grenadians had had time to do some preparation and even though ineffective, it was indicative of prior knowledge of the imminent American assault. Worst of all, if the accusations that the State Department alerted Cuba about the impending operation are true, then the United States violated this crucial principle of security at the strategic level. Whether or not that is true is irrelevant here; what's important is that all future players recognize the consequences of their actions and act to prevent the compromise of this important principle.

RESTRAINT

Restraint entails the wisdom to "apply appropriate military capability prudently"²⁰. The principle of restraint clashes with the approved standards for employment of military forces because, if not carefully evaluated, it can conflict with the principles of war, specifically, *mass*. In MOOTW the political and social sensibilities both at home and abroad may make the difference between success and failure. The indiscriminate use of force or disproportionate organization of a unit in such a situation may create an atmosphere that will counter the effects of the original intent.

I do not believe that the United States used a disproportionate force or too much actual force in Grenada. On the basis of the intelligence then available, or more accurately, not available, the U.S. forces were adequate for the task. Undoubtedly it was an overwhelming force when compared to the Cubans and Grenadians, but it's never been a virtue to seek equality in battle. Criticism of the size of the U.S. contingent comes from the same sources that would have severely criticized us for casualties had we underestimated the threat. Even in 1983, the concern for restraint was evident and resulted in constant updating of rules of engagement and command information programs designed to educate our soldiers on the island. A negative effect of restraint was the JTF's reluctance early on to allow what it considered heavy weapon systems, namely attack helicopters and more artillery, onto the island. This changed later when it became obvious that there was more resistance than expected.

PERSEVERANCE

Perseverance is the will to "prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims"²¹. In short, this requires having the fortitude in resources and character to dedicate the required time and material investment to the successful outcome of an operation. Bosnia comes immediately to mind with its one year time limit that is not necessarily tied to the desired end state. Grenada was a little simpler, but nevertheless ambiguous because we did not have a long term plan.

After Urgent Fury the United States committed forces and resources to Grenada to assist in developing a stronger social and economic system on the island. The timeline for this development was open ended and continues to today with economic assistance. The key point here is that this principle was observed then even though the long term implications may not have

been readily evident. As with many of the concepts reviewed in this study, this one too evolved as time progressed.

LEGITIMACY

In MOOTW legitimacy means that "committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable" The currently accepted legitimizing factors include: clear statements of intent, good use of the media, adherence to approved international standards of behavior, and reliance on regional and world organization support.

Grenada is a perfect example of how this can go wrong. The Administration and the military received major criticism for appearing to hide facts from the media and for alleged violations of international law and other diplomatic conventions. The fact is, no nation should ever have to rely on the international community for the immediate rescue of its citizens from a hostile situation.

The United States acted firmly and promptly to evacuate its citizens from Grenada and we can only speculate whether it acted prematurely or not. That, however, is not the question. The question is: how could the United States, given the need for swift and secret action, have acted to ward off some of the negative repercussions that arose early on in the operation?

The answer lies in actions that could have been taken as the operation progressed. I have already alluded to the first in the discussion on objectives. I do not believe that we were very convincing in stating those objectives. Secondly, the media took its exclusion from the operation as a professional affront and went on to severely criticize the entire endeavor, at least until it realized that the American public was, for the most part, in favor of the government. A better handling of the media could have produced a much different legacy given the same military

results. Much of the criticism was simply due to lack of information. This is information that the media could have disseminated for us.

Granted, there was very little that could have been done to prevent the wave of international condemnation that ensued. This was partly because the Cold War was still with us and partly because our allies were left out of the decision making. Again I do not believe that where American lives are at stake, we should wallow in the realm of international acceptability by obtaining resolutions to allow us to do what is rightfully our duty. Our citizens' safety should come first. Having said that, the legitimacy that the United Nations, regional alliances, and individual nation's approval and, if possible, participation give to MOOTW can help define success.

Except in matters of immediate danger to U.S. citizens, MOOTW should always seek to employ all possible avenues for legitimacy. These must be viewed as combat multipliers that, if properly employed, will ensure the success of the operation. We could have done much better in Grenada. The positive note is that we used Grenada as a learning vehicle and have become much more sophisticated in our use of the media and other legitimizing factors.

CONCLUSION

The operations that the United States conducted in Grenada provide us with a valuable opportunity to evaluate the doctrine of military operations other than war found in <u>Joint Pub 3-07</u>. Grenada is a good example because it is a combination of several types of MOOTW missions. Examining these within the context of one historical event provides a more thorough test of the doctrine than would an operation with one or two components or types of operations. In fact, the doctrine is even more valuable when dealing with a multifaceted operation because it forces the

planners to look at all possibilities and omit none. The value of having a doctrinal approach that approximates a checklist of components and principles should pay great dividends in the future as these types of missions become more prevalent. It should be evident from the beginning that some of the sixteen types of operations found in the manual, have no definite parameters and some, at times, may resemble other types. A recognition of this will allow planners to better deal with what is a naturally ambiguous realm of military operations.

This case study shows that the doctrine is valid both as applied to a historical event and, more importantly, to future operations. Grenada, would probably not have the legacy of imprecise execution, if not failure, had the U.S. military employed an analytical approach such as the one discussed in <u>Joint Pub 3-07</u>. Grenada was definitely an MOOTW and the current doctrine is definitely the tool for future Grenadas.

ENDNOTES

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